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tariff preferences  for the post-1980 period 
··'1  ~·  · Introduction 
The  initial ten-year period of application of the EECVs  generalized preferences 
scheme  put  into effect on  1  July 1971  expires at the end  of 1980. 
The  Council  of the European  Communities  has already stated that it intends to 
extend the scheme  beyond  the initial period1  and this decision has  been conveyed 
to the  Community's  developing country partners in various  forums  in recent years 
(Conference  on  International Economic  Cooperation,  UNGTAD  IV  and V).  The  Parliament 
and  the  Economic  and  Social  Committee  have  also pronounced  in  favour  of  an.extension. 
The  extension of the  Community's  scheme  for a  further period would  therefore 
appear to be a  political fact.  Accordingly,  in this communication the  Commission 
is presenting to the  Council  the guidelines which it considers  should be  followed 
in implementing the  new  scheme,  in the light  of the experience  of the initial 
period and  the prospects for  our relations with the developing countries.  The 
Commission  intends to present at a  later stage7  in good time for  a  decision to 
be  taken by the  Council  not  later than mid-November  1980,  formal  detailed proposals 
for  implementing the  GSP  for  1980.  The  proposals will be  based on  the guidelines 
set  out  in this communication. 
2.  &xPerience  gained from  the application of the GSP2 
The  most  important points arising out  of the practical  func·~ioning of the 
Community  scheme  may  be  summarized  as  follows: 
{i) the scheme's  impact  has  been  as  much  psychological 
as  economic,  as the actual use made  of the  GSP  in the 
last three years has represented on  average  only 19%  of total imports 
from  the beneficiary countries subject to customs  duty; 
1council  Resolution of  ~~ch 1975  on  the future development  of the  Community's 
2eeneralized tariff preferences. 
See  ~~~3X for an initial assessment  of the  GSP. - 2-
(ii) any danger to the various  sectors  of production in the EEC  has  been 
avoided,  notably by virtue of the ltmiting provisions  introduced as 
part of the  implementation of the rules of the scheme; 
(iii) the preferential advantages  have  been'used mainly by a  limited number  of 
beneficiary countries whose  economy  was  already relatively more  developed-
_or  diversified and  has  involved a  limited number  of products,  in respect 
of which  there was  already a  traditional flow of exports to the EEC; 
.(iv) the functioning of the  scheme  depends  on  the different rules  implemented 
in the  initial period of· application - and  on  the adjustments. made  to them 
from  time to time;  as a  result  of the rules,  however,  the  complexity of 
the  scheme  is such that it has to some  extent prevented the beneficiary 
developing countries from  makingfDll use of the  advantages offered; 
(v) the actual rate of use  of the  GSP1  is still Limited (55% to 60%  on  average); 
this is mainly due  to the fact that users have  concentrated on  products 
subject to relatively strict quantitative limits and  also the fact that 
their level of technological development  has prevented the beneficiary 
developing countries from  exporting 
quantities. 
3.  General  guidelines 
non-sensitive products  in large 
The  experience  of the first  ten years  of application shows  that there  is no  need 
to make  fundamental  changes to the  Community  scheme.  Notl'Tithstanding certain 
faults,  the  scheme  has  achieved the  objectives set for it, notably by striking 
a  balance  between the respective  interests of the developing countries and 
Community  producers,  against  an economic  background which  in the EEC  has  changed 
from  a  situation of sustained growth to one  in which  steep  inflation has been 
accompanied  by high levels  of unemployment. 
The  GSP  scheme  for the post-1980 period should take equal account  of the need to 
give effective help to industrial development  in the developing countries,  on  the 
one  hand,  and  the  compelling requirements  of the EEC's  industrial and  commercial 
policy,  on  the other.  I!".  :.;.:'.  ..  ,"..-:. -':io:'1. 1  provision w-ill  have  to be  made  for  any 
measures  tl:at oay serve to sir;:plify the use  of the system. 
1
This  rate represents the proportion of the preferential opportunities  open  each 
year which  is actually taken up. With  this  in view the new  scheme  should: 
.:> 
(i) be  adapted to the nev1  economic  conditions  now  prevailing in international 
relations and  to situations which  can already be  foreseen; 
(ii) take  account  of the  competitive  position  of  EEC  producers  with  a  vie1~· to 
ena~Ling  a  prdgressive  implementation  of  the  necessary  structural  adjustments  ; 
(iii) take equal  account  of the  Community's  interests as  an exporter of processed 
industrial products to the developing countries  and.  as  an  importer of raw 
materials from those  countries; 
(iv) be  applied in such  a  way  that the  developing countries which  stand in the 
greatest need may  be  given the widest  and  most  liberal preferential access 
through  measures to correct the uneven use  of the preferential advantages, 
whether at the  level  of the beneficiary countries or as regards  the 
products  on  which  use  of the  advantages is concentrated; 
(v) be  based  on  simplified implementjng provisions  as regards the  ,preferential 
limi-ts  and,  if possible,  the rules  of origin1  so as to enable the use  of 
the preferential advantages to be  spread as widely as possible. 
4•  .2]1e  rules  and  a.pnlication of j;,he  new  scheme 
In the  light of the general guidelines  set  out  above,  the  new  scheme  should meet 
the following implementing criteria: 
(a) Legal  status  of the new  scheme 
Rlcperience  has  shown  that the  "autonomous 11  nature  of the preferences - which has 
come  in for  ipcreasing criticism from the beneficiary developing countries - has 
enabled the  Community  scheme  to maintain its prind  .. ,  ·  :·f  offering the widest 
possible  opening and also to adapt flexibly to changing situations in international 
economic  relations.  These  adv~~tages should be  maintained  and the new  scheme  should 
continue to be  legally autonomous  rather than contractual. 
f''loreover,.  the developing countries now  have at their 
disposal  consultation procedures  '1-lhich  should enable them to examine  with the 
donor  countries the implementation  of the different  schemes. 
(b)  The  duration of the  nevi  scheme 
----~~~~~~.~~~~~ 
f'  ·  i·,'ne  donor  countries are no  longer tied to a  period of  Fro,.,  a  legal  i'oint  o.  v1.eH 
application linked to a  clause derogating from  the  GATT.  As  a  result of the 
work  of the  Frame1vork  Group  in the  MTN  the  implement  at  ion of the  GSP  does not -4-
require  a  derogation.  A balance  needs  to be  found,  ~erefore, between: 
(i) the desire  of the  develOping countries to be able to count  on  the  scheme 
being  implemented for a  sufficiently long period to enable  industrialization 
programmes  to be  established; 
. (ii) the need to ensure that,the scheme  does  not  continue to be  applicable  in 
completely changed  circumstances  in which it would  no longer be politically 
or economically justifiable. 
Furthermore,  there  is an important distinction to be  made  between the  actual 
principle of maintaining the generalized tariff preferences system in force 
and the question of the period during which  the  ~cheme itself would  be  applied 
without  substantive  changes. 
With  regru·d to the principle of maintaining the system in force,  the,GSP'oould 
be  implemented for  a  maximum  period of 20 years,  ioee  up  to the year 2000.  This 
date,  which  is sufficiently far away  to permit  industrial development  plans to 
be  implemented but at the  same  time does  not  seem  too remote,  has  the 
psychological advantage  of coinciding with the limit set by the  Lima  Conferen,ce 
of UNIDO  for industrial production in the developing countries to reach the 
level of 25%  of world production - seen as  a  target to aim at and  where  this 
is possibleo 
So  far as the period of application of a  scheme  based  on  unchanged  general rules 
is concerned,  in view of the rapid changes  which  could take place in the world 
economic  and political situation provision should be  made  for the scheme  to be 
subject to a  periodic review&qhich  could even cover the substance  of the scheme) 
should the situation make  this necessary or if it seemed  advisable  in the light 
of experience,  although the periods  involved should not  be  less than five years. 
(c)  Consideration to be  given to ~differential 11  application of the preferential 
advantages 
The  evident  imbalance  in 'the  use  of the  scheme  should be  corrected by enabling 
the  less competitive developing countries to make  better use  of the advantages 
offered.  Although it is clear that this is not  the sole factor governing the 
. uneven distribution of benefits,  nevertheless it cannot  be  denied that a  result 
of the  Community  scheme  has  been,  notably as  regards  industrial products,  that 
countries which  are  economically more  advanced and have  more  fully developed 
marketing networks  take  up  the preferential advantages  more  quickly,  at the 
expense  of economically weaker  developing countriesc  Furthermore,  it .has  been 
found  in recent years  that certain beneficiary developing countries have  developed 
rapidly to the point that  in some  sectors their competitive position is such that 
with the  preferen~ial adv~~tage added their exports could cause difficulty for 
certain sectors  of  Community  production. - 5-
There  '<!Ould  therefore be  a  h!Ofold  advantage  in lirr.i ting the preferences 
accorded  to  these countries in the  sectors or for the  products concerned:  it 
\·1ould  provide  scope for enlarging the  preferential  advantages for the less 
co~petitive beneficia~ countries  and would  also  prevent  excessive  pressure 
being brout;ht  to  bear on the sectors of production in the  EEC  which  are in 
difficulties and  may  need  a  certain period of time  for restructuring. 
However,  the products  and  countries in respect  of -v;hich  limitations should be 
introduced \·;ill  have  to be  identified on the basis of objective criteria which 
take  account  of  the  economic  situation  in  the  sectors  and  countries  concerned. 
The  criteria to  be  used  should  in general  be  based 
principle that  the  GSP  concessions  should be  proportionately more  generous  towards 
the  beneficiar,y countries  which  have  made  least  progress  along the  road to 
development.  Accordingly,  the criteria should have  regard in particular to the 
following: 
economic  and  social  indicators  of  the  beneficiary  countries  ; 
- the use  found to have been made  of the preferential  advantages  in the 
preceding period  as  regards  the maxirnllm  counti"J  amounts  (butoirs); 
the situation of  a  given product  or sector with particular reference to 
the  share of the  EEC  internal  market  taken by  imports; 
- the situation of the countries  concerned as  producers  and  exporters  of 
the products  in question. 
For political and  practical  reasons  1  the  application of a  "differential" limitation 
of preferential advantages  should not  be  so  designed as to  result in the  exclusion 
of beneficia~ countries or products or sectors.  Ex:clu.Jing  a  country from 
preferential treatment  in respect  of a  given product  should be  considered only 
in exceptional cases. 
To  conclude,  the application of  p~eferential advantages  should be  based on the 
follo'<!ing  principles: 
-it should  not  involve  the  complete  exclusion neither  of  a  beneficiary nor  of 
a  product  nor  sector  ; 
-it should  provide  for  a  differential  allocation  of  the preference  according 
to product  and  country  ; 
-it should be  a.:.~,ed  at  according greater liberalization to  the least developed 
and  poorest  countries. 
It would  also  be  appropriate to bear in mind  the  Commission1 s  proposal  relating 
to  compli<:L:-Jce  iii th  minimum  l<:Lbour  stand<:Lrds  a.'1<i  the  implications of this principle 
f  '  .  '  or tnc  li'lple~cntation of  ,c;enero.li~ed  preferer;ces  should it be  adopted qy the 
Council  (1). In thi::; connection the Commission  1.-Ji  LL  put forward more specific suggestions 
_in  its formal and detaiLed prooosals for the new  scheme~ 
(1)  Doc.  COMC78)492  final - 6-
5.  St mctural  chan:;-es  in the  ne1·r  scheme 
Experience has  shown  that the  Cou~nity scheme has  become  fairly complex  and 
that  C\'>nZGquonUy  it ia  advict.blo  to put  the  applio:l'Lio:c of the prinoiple of 
"differentiation" in accordinG preferential advantages  on a  new basis.  The 
change  must  therefore meet  the  tvro  requirements of simplification and "differential" 
application of preferential treatment.  Study of other donor countries'  schemes 
reveals  no  satisfactory feature that  could be  applied as  an  improvement  to  the 
Community  scheme.  Either they apply excessively inflexible or automatic  rules 
••ith  re~.;ard to the  exclusion of beneficiaries or··products  (e.g. the United States 
scher:te}  or the  more  generous  advantages  they offer relate to  products  and sectors -. 
notably in agriculture - v1hich,  if included,  could endanger  Community  production. 
Consequently it would  appear to be  advisable  1  i-Jhile  retaining the overall 
structure of the  EEC  scheme,  to  adapt it along the following lines. 
(a)  Product  covera.:;e 
Vli th  reGard to agricultural products  1  the list of products  covered by the 
preferences has been steadily enlarged  and  now  extends to  310 tariff headings 
covering practically all the products which  do  not  represent  a  threat  of 
injurious  competition to  EEC  production.  Given the constraints of the  common 
agricultural policy and the  need to  safeguard opportunities for access  for the 
ACP  countries~ or,  in the  case of certain products,  opportunities for the 
Mediterranean countries - a.."ld  the possibility of the accession of new  countries  1 
it would be  inappropriate to iriden the  present  product  coverage,  although  consi-
deration  could  however  be  aiven_to  certain  improvements  to  the  present  arranqe-
ments  if this  could  be  justified, especially for  the  Least  Developed  countrie~. 
In the  case of industrial products,  the  coverage  provided by the  EEC  scheme is 
among  the most  complete.  Certain semi-manufactures  or products  of first-stage 
processing are not  included,  ho.-Jever,  notably  ra,·r  hides  and  skins,  certain 
textile primary products  and  certain metals up to the ingot  stage.  Consideration 
could be  given to the possibility of admitting them to preferential treatment, 
as  such  a  measure '"ould be of particular help to the least developed  countries. 
In vie"' of the  restrictive policies applied by different beneficiaries in respect 
of exports of the  products in question,  ho,vever,  the question of their inclusion 
would  have  to be  gone  into very thoroughly  and  account  would have to be  taken of 
the need to  safeguard supplies for the EEC. - 1-
(b)  The  beneficia~y countries 
It is possible to  div~de beneficiary countries into three categories, 
depandin~ on  thair present  level Qf  development: 
(i)  Newly  industrializing.and highly competitive developing countries:  for 
some  products these countries have  achieved a  competitive position on  the 
Community  market  which  lessens the need for preferences.  Moreover,  their 
aggressive export  policies make  it impossible for other beneficiaries to  ge~ 
the full preferential advantage  offered on  those products.  Objective 
··  criteria must  therefore be  used to 'restrict the preferential advantage  going 
to countries in this  category. 
(ii)  Poorest  countries and  LLDCs:  the EEC  scheme  already includes virtually 
complete  liberalization for the least  advanced  developing countries  as  listed 
by  the UN.  This is essential if these  countries are to have  any  chan~e of 
expor\ing their products.  The  present  arrangements  should therefore be 
continued and  further improved  (e.g.  in the matter of product  cover)  where 
possible.  The  list of beneficiaries should also be updated  in the light of 
further UN  additions,  and  indeed reviewed to  see whether the  Community  should 
not  include other countries with particularly weak  economies  and  a  low  levei 
of development. 
(iii)  Developing countries not  falling into either of the  above  two  categories: 
these are the  countries which  could potentially benefit the most  from 
preterences,  since they already possess,  albeit at  a  modest  level, the 
financial  and  technical basis on  which  to build processing industries with an 
export  capacity.  For these  countries the  scheme  should be  liberalized as  far 
as possible to allow them  to make  the  most  of the  preferences  on  offer by 
developing their exports of new  products. 
(c)  Simplificatio~ of the  arrangements  for industrial products 
The  Community's  new  scheme  \..rould  exclude neither 
certain particularly sensitive  products nor  some  highly-competitive 
beneficiary countries.  But  the  new  rules should make  it possible to exercise 
selective control  over exports  of sensitive industrial products  originating 
in certain beneficiary countries. 
Industrial goods  other than textiles are  currently divided into four categories: 
sensitive products  (15 tariff headings),  hybrid  semi-sensitive products  (28 
headings),  semi-sensitive products  (81  headings)  and non-sensitive products 
(around  1  700  headings). benef_iciary 
- e-
Each.category is subject to different rules regarding control  and  observance  of 
preferential  Limits  ,  at the level either of the beneficiaries as  a  whole 
0~ gf individual oountries.  The  whole  S¥Bt~m has become  so  complicated that it 
is now  difficult for users to grasp in detail,  or apply correctly.  This 
complexity is the result  of measures  designed to take  account  of the degree  of 
sensitivity of the  product itself, or of the existence of beneficiary countries 
which  are  super-competitive in certain products,  or  ~ain of the different 
degrees  of sensitivity of a  single product  in different Member  States.  However, 
proceeding on  the  assumption - shown  by experience to be  correct - that the 
"sensitivity" of a  product  can  almost  always  be  traced to one,  two  or at most 
three beneficiary countries, it ought  to be  possible to deal with the  problem 
created by those  countries while  at the same  time  simplifying administration of 
the  scheme  by  allowing freer  access for other beneficiaries. 
Thin  could  be  done  by using only two  product  categories: 
-non-sensitive products,  simply-monitored statistically;  these could be 
reclassified  at  the start of a  ne\·1  period under the  scheme  if exports by 
the beneficiary countries Nere  likel~·  substantially to  i,njure  EEC  producers  ; 
- sensitive products  (initially goods  falling within one  of the three categories 
subject to surveillance).  For  such products,  the most  competitive beneficiary 
countries would  be  identified on  the basis of objective criteria reflecting 
the  economic  position of the beneficiaries,  the situation of EEC  producers  and 
the state of trade relations betv1een  the EEC  and  the  countries involved.  For 
such countries and  for  each  product  concerned  Community  quotas or tariff  ceilin~s 
·~auld be  fixed  and  applied  in  most  cases  to  each  individual  country identified as 
.competitive  and  in  exceptional  cases  to all  cbuntr'ies  so- ident'ified.  For  all· other 
developing countries,  the  preferences would  be  administered  just as they are  for 
the non-sensitive  products  now;  .a theoretical ceiling would  be  set  and,  in 
the  event  of duly-established market  disturbance,  exceeding this limit could 
trigger the reintroduction of customs duties  (decided on  a  case•by-case basis). 
Consideration of the  current  GSP  utilization rate  shows  that  such a  streamlining 
is both possible and  necessaryo  Strict controls would  affect only  a  limited  number 
of  countries in all, normally no  more  than one  or two  beneficiaries for  any one 
product.  The  simplified system would  also make  it .possible to monitor  about 
7o%  of the current actual utilization of quotas  and hybrid ceilings,  appreciably 
lowering the risk to  Co~munity industries. - 9-
As  far as textile products  are  concerned,  it would  seem  inadvisable at this 
stage to think of making  substantive changes to the arrangements  introduced 
as  recently as  l  January of this year.  Thera  will not  be  suffioient 
information available to  judge the  effects of the new  system,  which 
incorporates an entirely new  set of implementing rules.  The  current  scheme, 
moreover,  is linked to the operation of the  agreements  concluded under the 
MFA.  These  are due  to expire in 1982  and it would  be  logical to await  the 
decisions to be  taken in this connection rather than tamper with arrangements 
set up  after lengthy discussions.  Even  here,  however,  a  number  of adjustments 
could be  contemplated with the  aim  of eliminating unnecessary controls and 
improving access for the less competitive countries. 
With  regard to the rules of origin,  there have  been numerous  criticisms from 
beneficiar.y countries finding them  restrictive  and  over-complex.  While 
holding to the underlying principles, it might  be  possible to look at  w~s of 
streamlining the rules and  making  them  more  liberal,  particularly on the 
question of "cumulative" origin in countries belonging to regional groupings 
and  on  the  11donor's content" principle. 
(d)  Administrative  changes 
The  administration  of  the  preferences  system  should  also  be  simplified.  An 
adequate  solution  would  be  to  introduce  a  distinction between  on  the  one  hand 
decisions  of  day-to-day  administration  concerning  the  application  of  tariff 
measures,  supervision  of  the utilisation·of  the  system  and  the  annual  up-dating 
of  the  system,  and  on  the  other  hand  important  decisions  concerning  general 
directives  and  the  revision  of  the  system  at  regular  intervals.  Decisions  of  the 
latter type  would  have  to  be  taken  as  in  the  past  by  the  Council  acting  on  a 
proposal .from  the  Commission  ;  by  contrast,  as·  far  as  day-to-day  admin+stration 
is  concerned,  it  is  the  view  of  the  Commission  that  it  should  itself take  the 
decisions  in  this area,  after  consulting  Member  States according  to  some  management 
procedure  to  be  created  for  this purpose  and  in  regard  to  which  it  will  when  the 
comes  put  forward  formal  proposals. INITIAL  ASSESSMENT  OF  THE  OPERATION  OF  THE 
CONMUNITY'S  SCHEJ.JE  OF  GENERALIZED  TARIFF  PREFERENCES 
I 
1.  The  Community  of Six introduced its scheme  on  1  July 1971;  it was  subsequently 
applied by the  Nine  with effect from  1  January  1974.  Successive schemes  have 
seen constant  increases  in the preferential opportunities for all categories of 
product  and,  since  1975,  the  Community  has  angled its scheme  to achieve a  more 
balanced  spre<~ of the benefits  offered.  Thus  access has  been progressively 
liberalized for the  least developed countries,  while various  steps have been 
taken to limit the preferences taken up  by the most  competitive countries,  in 
order to give  other beneficiaries a  more  equitable share. 
The  glo-bal  Community  offer,  excluding textiles·,  rose by 75%  from  1974  to  1919, 
from  3  700  million u.a.  to 6  500 million EUA. 
The  number  of agricultural products  covered by the  GSP  rose  from  187  in 1974 
to 310  in 1979  and  the volume  of trade involved has  trebled,  from  450 million u.a. 
to the present  level  of 1  350  million EUA.  This notable  advance  is largely due 
to the implementation of the Joint Declaration of Intent  and the  offer on  . 
tropical products  made  in the  framework  of the Multilateral  Trade  Negotiations. 
In addition,  some  products have  been added to the agricultural list to take. account 
of bilateral relations between the  Community  and certain beneficiary countries, 
for example  soluble  coffee  and  cocoa butter from Brazil and Virginia-type tobacco 
from  India. 
The  offer for  industrial goods  other than textiles,  which  stood at  2  800 million u.a. 
in 1974,  is now  worth  5  100  million EUA,  an  increase of  82f~  Over  the same  period 
the number  of.industrial products  subject to quota  or strictly-monitored ceilings 
has risen from  152  to 182,  out  of a  total of  1  850 tariff headings  covered by the 
GSP. - 2-
It should be  pointed out  that the theoretical basis for  cal9ulating the offer has 
not  always  been  observed in the  case  of products under surveillance.  This has 
been the  case  in particular from  1975  on"Vrards,  owing to the  reperou~J~1ona of' 
the energy crisis .on  the  Community's  trade.  At  the moment,  the theoretical 
method  is actually applied for about  50%  of products under surveillance.  For 
the remainder,  fixed-rate  increases  lower than those which  would  have resulted 
from  calculation by the  normal  method  have  generally been offered,  although in 
a  few  cases the volume  of the offer has  been "frozen" at the previous year's 
level  (the  offer for ECSC  products  has  been held at the  same  level since 1976). 
This practice was  introduced to strike a  balance between the interests of the 
beneficiary countries and those  of  Community  industries;  similar action has 
been taken to preserve the  interests of the  ACP  States,  particularly in the  case. 
of plywood. 
The  offer on  textiles rose in volume  terms  over the period 1974-79  from  68  200  tonnes 
to about  87  300  tonnes,  an increase  of  29f~ 
Utilization of preferential advantages  is concentrated  on  a  fairly small number 
of beneficiary countries,  some  70%  going to thirteen countries;  in 1977, 
17  countries accounted for 85%  of utilization.  This phenomenon  occurs  in the  schemes 
of other donor countries  as well,  and  is not really surprising,  since the  GSP 
mainly covers manufactured industrial products and  thus  is essentially of 
benefit to countries having attained a  certain level of economic  development  and 
those with traditional trade  flows  to the  Community  or a  fairly wide  range  of 
industrial products.  This  means  that the chief beneficiaries  include not  only 
a  number  of the fairly advanced developing countries,  but also countries like 
India,  Pakistan,  Peru,  Indonesia and the Philippines,  which  belong to the 
low-income  group.  It should be  noted,  hovrever,  that for  a  number  of countries 
the high utilization rate is based  on  a  single group  of products:  palm oil 
accounts for  62%  of Malaysia's total,  tobacco for 44%  of Indones,ia's  and 
petroleum products for 73%  and  94%  respectively of the total for Romania  and 
Venezuela. - 3-
Consideration of the incidence of duties reintroduced under the maximum 
oo\mtcy amo1mt  s;ystem  indioatelil  a  ~rowinji uae of the GSP  for products 
...  under surve:j.llance,  s:j.nc;e  the nlll!lber  wa.,:;  up  from  109  in 1974 _to  172  in 
1979·  A total of twenty-eight beneficiaries were  affected by 
restorations of duties,  with Yugoslavia,  Hong Kong  and South Korea 
alone totalling 102  in 1978. 
Under  the  ceilings,  there were  21  cases of duties being restored in 1974 
and  35  in 1978. 
The  list of beneficiary countries has not  been substantially altered since 
the  introduction of the GSP  and  the preferences have  generally been granted 
to developing countries which  are members  of the Group  of 77•  So  far the 
only exception has  been Romania,  which  was  not  a  member  of that Group  when 
the decision was  taken to include it among  the beneficiaries of the scheme 
(China will benefit  from  the GSP  for the first time in 1980). 
2.  The  above  considerations suggest the following general conclusions as 
to the operation of the  Community  GSP  during its initial period: 
(a)  On  the whole  the  increase of the preferential offer between  1974  and 
1979  can be regarded as fairly satisfactory,  even if it is more  the result 
of specific factors  (offer on  tropical products,  Joint Declaration of Intent) 
than of a  deliberately conceived policyj 
'(b)  Utilization of preferential advantages is still limited to a  fairly small 
number  of products,  mainly  conc~ntrated in. sectors where  the competitive 
position of the beneficiaries in relation to.  Community  industry is favourable 
(c)  The  rate of utilization of preferences offered is still modest, 
particularly because of the fact  that strict quantitative limits are  ~posed 
on the  products most  exported by  the developing countries,  while  in the case 
of many  non-sensitive products,  beneficiaries are unable  to take up the 
preferences for lack of the financial  and  technical resources to develop 
production of those products; (d)  A relatively small  number  of countries take up the bulk of preferences 
offered.  These  countries,  however,  include not  only some  with  a.  fairly 
advanced  level  of development,  but  also  much  less-developed countries which 
have  other factors in their favour:  traditional trade patterns,  geographical 
proximity or major exports of a.  small number  of products; 
(e)  While  GSP  cover has been constantly increased,  the volume  of preferential 
imports is still extremely low in relation to total Community  imports  from 
the beneficiary countries;  the proportion varies widely from  sector to sector 
and,  with  one  or two  limited exceptions  1  it cannot  be  maintained that 
preferential imports  alone constitute a  threat to industries in the 
Community,  since their share of total Community  imports is so  low  (in 1976 
and 1977,  sensitive products  entering under the GSP  accounted for between 
3%  and  4%  of total imports of those products). 